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Carbon Trading with Blockchain
Andreas Richardson and Jiahua Xu
Abstract Blockchain has the potential to accelerate the deployment of emissions
trading systems (ETS) worldwide and improve upon the efficiency of existing sys-
tems. In this paper, we present a model for a permissioned blockchain implement-
ation based on the successful European Union (EU) ETS and discuss its potential
advantages over existing technology. We propose an ETS model that is both back-
wards compatible and future-proof, characterised by interconnectedness, transpar-
ency, tamper-resistance and high liquidity. Further, we identify key challenges to
implementation of a blockchain ETS, as well as areas of future work required to
enable a fully-decentralised blockchain ETS.
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1 Introduction
Carbon trading systems such as the European Union Emissions Trading System
(EU ETS) provide a market mechanism to incentivise emissions reduction, on the
basis of cap and trade. An overall cap on emissions in tonnes of CO2-equivalent1
(tCO2e) is imposed, which is translated by a central authority into allowances that
are issued to companies. These allowances are surrendered and retired at the end
of a reporting period to offset the company’s emissions during the period, with
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the company free to trade any surplus allowances on the market [29]. Importantly,
should a company have insufficient allowances to cover their (expected) emissions,
they are obliged to either purchase surplus allowances fromothermarket participants,
or take measures to reduce their emissions. Thus, a high price for allowance units
incentivises participants to choose the latter option.
On first inspection, this system would seem to be suited to an application of
blockchain technology: it involves multiple distributed parties transacting using
common currencies, with transactions recorded in an immutable ledger. Indeed,
multiple organisations and startups are actively exploring this approach [8]. However
on closer inspection, it is clear that the current state of ETS development poses some
critical challenges to the adoption of blockchain technology. For example, one of
the frequently-cited advantages of blockchain is the “disintermediation of trust”
[9, 10, 1], meaning a central trusted authority is not required for the network to reach
consensus. Yet current ETS designs make heavy use of trusted authorities: a central
(governmental) authority is responsible for the distribution of allowances under the
cap, whether by direct allocation or through an auction process; further, companies
must report their emissions to the central authority and seek verification of this figure
from a third-party [19]. In addition, attacks and fraudulent activities permeating the
blockchain space continue to act as a barrier against immediate adoption of the still
evolving technology [11, 46].
As a result, a clear and compelling case must be made to justify the advant-
ages of blockchain over existing technologies. A number of frameworks have been
proposed for assessing potential blockchain implementations, considering technical,
organisational and legal factors [32, 10, 9], whilst a series of strategic questions
have been raised for business leaders evaluating blockchain’s potential [23]. The
extreme interest shown in blockchain technology over recent years and the resulting
disillusionment with its failure to meet over-hyped promises means the technology
is treated with caution; its pros and cons must be carefully weighed [34, 35, 22].
In this paper, we lay out the advantages and challenges of implementing
blockchain-backed ETS system, and propose a hybrid model that is both backward
compatible and future-proof.
2 Background
We first present the EU ETS as a prime example of a contemporary ETS, using it to
introduce discussion of weaknesses in current ETS and areas where blockchain tech-
nology has strong potential. We additionally present a review of selected literature
in this space.
1 Scaling factors known as Global Warming Potentials (GWPs) are used to normalise the impact
of different Greenhouse Gases (GHGs) emitted.
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2.1 EU ETS
The EU ETS was launched in 2005 and has become the largest ETS to date, repres-
enting the majority of international emissions trading [12]. Its coverage extends to
over 11 000 installations with significant energy usage as well as airlines operating
in the EU, together representing about half of the EU’s greenhouse gas (GHG) emis-
sions2 [18]. A representative schematic of the different players and transactions of
the EU ETS is presented in Fig. 1.
Fig. 1 Overview of EU ETS.
Lines represent transactions
between parties; the two layers
of government represent the
European Commission and
member states.
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Tradeable instruments The EU ETS introduces a new tradeable instrument along-
side the allowance unit: credits. Whilst allowances are issued by governments of
member states through allocation or auction, credits are generated through emissions-
reduction projects in other countries under Kyoto Protocol mechanisms. Any al-
lowances or credits which are surplus to an installation’s requirement to offset its
emissions may be freely traded for profit [19].
Impact Relative to a 2005 baseline, the EU ETS is expected to have reduced
emissions by 21% in 2020 and by 43% in 2030, indicating that the underlying
market mechanism is functioning as expected [18].
2 The GHGs covered by the EU ETS are carbon dioxide (CO2), nitrous oxide (N2O) and perfluoro-
carbons (PFCs).
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2.2 Potential and suitability of blockchain
Despite the successes highlighted previously, there still exist issues and challenges
with both the EUETS, and ETSmore broadly, which this paper seeks to address. Spe-
cifically, we argue that the blockchain technology shows great potential to advance
the state of the art in a number of key areas of ETS development.
Coverage Existing ETS are restricted in terms of geographical coverage, with large
portions of the world currently lacking plans to implement ETS [9]. A distributed
scalable blockchain-based ETS solution could rapidly support new carbon markets.
Article 6 of the 2018 Paris Agreement already provides a foundation for decentralised
cooperative climate action; blockchain is expected to be a key technology to deliver
these ambitions, particularly through future carbon markets [6, 15].
Linkage A key challenge of existing ETS is that few systems are yet linked to
each other. Although some ETS have previously implemented links, the process is
complex and lengthy, as evidenced by the near decade-long process to link the Swiss
and EU ETS [20, 13]. For the UK, an exit from the EU—and consequently the
EU ETS—may hinder attempts to meet future carbon budgets [24]. In this context,
an easily extensible linked ETS solution that can be rapidly deployed in new areas
would be highly desirable.
An interlinked web of ETS would increase market liquidity and size [30, 41, 37,
16], and reduce opacity relative to siloed systems. Transparently linking multiple
ETS would increase the cost, and hence lower the chance, of fraudulently claiming
credits from the same project in multiple systems (“double-counting”) [9, 10, 16].
Cost A (semi-)automated decentralised system can be expected to reduce overall
transaction cost, especially if fixed costs are spread across a large network. Lower
transaction cost will reduce barriers to entry, allowing coverage to be extended to
smaller enterprises and less-developed geographies.
Trust Codified protocols in immutable smart contracts are tamperproof and thus
blockchain ETS are expected to improve trust relative to existing systems [7]. This
could help maintain market confidence and integrity with linked ETS, for example
if one ETS operates in a jurisdiction with increased risk of corruption [16].
Transparency The shared, distributed nature of a blockchain system underpins
transparency. Address anonymity (or perhaps pseudonymity) with blockchain would
allow transaction data to be made available in much greater detail, without com-
promising privacy or confidentiality concerning e.g. ETS players’ trading positions.
Compared to the EU ETS transaction log (EUTL), from which relatively little data
is made available, increased scrutiny of public data could strengthen systems and
reduce the risk of government corruption [19, 21, 9, 10].
Consensus and fault tolerance Consensus mechanisms provide a degree of fault
tolerance that could mitigate the consequences of misbehaviour of network parti-
cipants [5, 2, 43]. This is relevant particularly in the context of linking ETS, where
many players will be connected to the system.
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2.3 Existing work
Crucially, existing attempts to bring the benefits of blockchain to carbon trading
have generally suffered from limited impact and short lifespan [21], being largely
predicated on the small voluntary carbon market. As such, any blockchain solution
will require significant support from existing ETS regulators to ensure sufficient im-
petus for further growth and development. Once “critical mass” is achieved however,
a solution can be expected to become self-sustaining; the contribution of regulators
to facilitate access to the regulatory compliance market is likely to be a significant
factor for success. It is also important to remember that blockchain is not a panacea,
despite what may have been written about it in the press over the past years; the
technology still suffers from important limitations [44] (see discussion in Section 4).
Table 1 presents selected existing works related to the present discussion; whilst
the concept of blockchain ETS has already been broadly discussed, there remains
scope for additional work considering the practical implementation of such an ETS,
which this paper seeks to address.
Table 1 Overview of selected existing works
Source Description
Discussion papers
[4] Presents a systems engineering approach to a decentralised emissions trading infrastruc-
ture. Reviews architecture (covering e.g. database type, credit issuance, existence of central
authority etc.) of other carbon trading schemes.
[9] Outlines blockchain potential for ETS, climate mitigation and climate finance applications
in the specific context of Mexico, with discussion of potential implementation (technolo-
gies, costs, roadmap etc.).
[10] Provides an overview of blockchain potential, suitability and challenges for applications
including ETS, MRV and climate finance.
[16] Describes current climate markets from a technological perspective and discusses im-
provements. Presents potential and suitability of blockchain without discussion of imple-
mentation.
[21] Argues for the suitability and potential of blockchain in achieving the commitments of the
Paris Agreement and for climate action in general, with discussion of areas of required
future work.
Implementation work
[17] Discusses general suitability of blockchain for ETS applications, and presents a proof-of-
concept implementation for a transportation-specifc ETS using Hyperledger Iroha.
[28] Proof-of-concept blockchain for green certificates (proof of electricity generation from
renewable sources) in amicrogrid electricity trading environment.Uses theCorda platform.
[31] Proof-of-concept ETS implementation using ‘reputation points’ to determinemarket access
priority, thus aiming to tackle security issues identified with EU ETS. Includes detailed
quantitative analysis of improvement relative to conventional systems.
[33] Develops detailed proof-of-concept blockchain ETS based on EU ETS, using smart con-
tracts on Ethereum. Discusses software development process (requirements, use cases) and
system architecture (implementation) in detail.
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3 Proposal
Whilst it is tempting to develop a completely decentralised blockchain-based ETS, a
more pragmatic approach might be to improve upon existing ETS frameworks. Thus,
we propose a hybrid model combining some decentralisation whilst maintaining a
role for trusted authorities, as outlined briefly in Fig. 2. This does not preclude a
future switch to a fully decentralised model, but it is expected to provide an easier
transition to blockchain technology for existing ETS players, increasing the practical
feasibility of the proposal.
Fig. 2 Schematic showing
potential interactions in the
outlined blockchain ETS.
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3.1 Taxonomy
In this proposal the following definitions are used:
organisation The simplest type of entity in the network, upon which other roles
are built. An organisation provides a framework to manage common
metadata required to interact with the blockchain (e.g. public/private
key management).
authority Governmental or supranational body, with legislative power over
other authorities or enterprises within a certain jurisdiction.
enterprise “Legal person” consisting of one or more installations or projects
that uses the network to report and/or offset emissions. An enterprise
may be mandated to participate by an authority, or access voluntarily
and may carry verifier status.
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installation Physical source ofGHGemissions—such as factories,manufacturing
plants, offices—owned by one or more enterprises.
project Emissions reduction scheme generating carbon credits under Kyoto
Protocol mechanisms, owned by one or more enterprises.
verifier Status awarded to an enterprise by an authority, allowing it to perform
verification functions within the network.
3.2 Tokens
Two types of token are envisaged for network, closely mirroring current ETS book-
keeping [19, 9] (see Section 3.5).
emission 1 tCO2e verified GHG emissions.
permit permit to emit 1 tCO2e that can represent both allowances issued by an
authority, or credits granted by a verifier.
3.3 Processes
In this section, we present a basic outline of processes performed on the network,
illustrated with smart contract pseudocode required for their execution.3At the scale
required of an international ETS, a custom-developed blockchain may be more
appropriate; nevertheless, our approach provides a simple framework for presenting
and debating a proof-of-concept.
Role change An authority can change the role of an enterprise, including promotion
of an enterprise to verifier status or removal of an existing status.
Algorithm 1 Role change
1 Function setRole(address sender, address target, string newRole)
2 require sender.role = authority and target.role , newRole // Sender
must be authorised and request is a change
3 target.role← newRole
Issuance of permit Emission permits can represent both allowances, issued by an
authority, or credits, issued by a verifier.
3 Our pseudocode is inspired by the Solidity language used to implement smart contracts on the
Ethereum blockchain.
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An authority can mint permit tokens typically in an amount corresponding to the
desired cap level. They may be issued through direct allocation or auction.
Algorithm 2 Mint permit token
1 Function mintPermit(address signer, address target, uint256 amount)
2 require signer.role = authority // Only authorities can mint permits
3 target.balance[permit] += amount
4 market.balance[permit] += amount
Permit tokens can also represent credits granted by a verifier to an enterprise
owning emission-reducing projects.
Algorithm 3 Grant permit token
1 Function grantPermit(address signer, address target, uint256 amount)
2 require hasProject(target) and signer.role = verifier // Verifier
ensures that the enterprise has a carbon-reducing project
3 target.balance[permit] += amount
4 market.balance[permit] += amount
Both mintPermit and grantPermit allow permit tokens to be issued “out of
thin air”, thus increasing the total circulating supply of the token in the market.
Issuance of emissions Emission tokensmay beminted by any enterprise if a verifier
co-signs the transaction as a true reflection of the enterprise’s emissions.
Algorithm 4 Mint emission token
1 Function mintEmission(address sender, address signer, uint256
amount)
2 require signer.role = verifier // Must be signed by a verifier
3 sender.balance[emission] += amount
4 market.balance[emission] += amount
Transfer tokens Permit tokens which represent emission allowances and credits
may be freely transferred among network participants, who may choose to create
derivative products such as swaps and options (as in the EU ETS [19, p.71]) or to
send tokens to an exchange.
Algorithm 5 Transfer permit tokens
1 Function transferPermit(address sender, address target, uint256
amount)
2 require amount ≤ sender.balance[permit]
// Must have enough token for request
3 sender.balance[permit] –= amount
4 target.balance[permit] += amount
Burn tokens Emissions tokens are burnt alongside an equal or greater number of
allowance or credit tokens sent in the same transaction to a smart contract. This
process also permits enterprises to voluntarily surrender excess allowance or credit
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tokens if they so choose (as is possible in the EU ETS [19, p. 131]). Enterprises are
forbidden from transacting with emissions tokens in any other way.
Algorithm 6 Burn tokens
1 Function burnToken(address sender, uint256 amount)
2 require amount ≤ sender.balance[permit] // Must have enough token
3 if sender.balance[emission] ≥ amount then
// Only burning part of emission balance
4 sender.balance[emission] –= amount
5 else if sender.balance[emission] < amount then
// Burning beyond emission balance (voluntary surrender)
6 sender.balance[emission] = 0
7 sender.balance[permit] –= amount
Token exchange Organisations can freely trade their permit tokens with the author-
ity. To ensure liquidity in the market and hence enhance the tradability of tokens, we
can implement the Bancor protocol [40, 25] which automates price determination
through a smart contract (see Algorithms 7 and 8, and Appendix A).
Algorithm 7 Trade tokens
1 Function tradeToken(address sender, int256 amount)
2 supply← market.balance[permit]
3 cashAmount← reserve * ((1 + amount/supply )^(1/fraction) – 1)
// Based on eq. (7) in Appendix
4 if amount > 0 then
5 require cashAmount ≤ sender.cash // Must have cash to spend
6 sender.balance[permit] += amount
7 market.balance[permit] += amount
8 sender.cash –= cashAmount
9 reserve += cashAmount
10 else if amount <= 0 then
11 require amount ≤ sender.balance[permit] // Must have token to sell
12 sender.balance[permit] += amount
13 market.balance[permit] += amount
14 sender.cash += cashAmount
15 reserve –= cashAmount
3.4 Market adjustment
With the development of technology, the cost of emissions reduction will decrease
over time. As a result, the supply of surplus allowances and credits will increase
whilst demand for them decreases, driving the price of tokens down. Thus it may
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Algorithm 8 Convert Cash
1 Function convertCash(address sender, int256 amount)
2 supply← market.balance[permit]
3 tokenAmount← supply * ((amount/ reserve + 1)^fraction −1)
// Based on eq. (8) in Appendix
4 if amount > 0 then
5 require amount ≤ sender.cash // Must have cash to spend
6 sender.balance[permit] += tokenAmount
7 market.balance[permit] += tokenAmount
8 sender.cash –= amount
9 reserve += amount
10 else if amount <= 0 then
11 require tokenAmount ≤ sender.balance[permit] // Must have token to
sell
12 sender.balance[permit] –= tokenAmount
13 market.balance[permit] –= tokenAmount
14 sender.cash += amount
15 reserve –= amount
become cheaper for firms to use credits to offset their emissions rather than reducing
the emissions directly.
This is when the authority comes into play to steer the market. In addition to
having the power to change the cap level and so restrict the supply of allowances,
the price of tokens can also be adjusted through the exchange. From (4) and its
illustration presented in Fig. 3, it is clear that the tokens’ market price can be raised
in two ways:
• Reducing reserve fraction F, allowing for cash to be spent from the exchange and
thus enhancing its purchasing power;
• Increasing the total stablecoin reserve C0, thus enhancing the purchasing power
of the exchange;
Naturally, to reduce the token price, the authority simply needs to do the opposite.
3.5 Carbon bookkeeping on and off blockchain
We demonstrate the compatibility of our proposed blockchain-based model with the
existing ETS frameworks through an illustrative example. In principle, blockchain
is underpinned by time-honoured bookkeeping mechanisms including TEA (Triple
Entry Accounting) and REA (Resources-Events-Agents) [26, 27]. Therefore, the
compatibility between the conventional and the newly proposed ETS record-keeping
framework is expected to an extent.
In our illustrative example, we assume that:
1. On January 1, 2020, the market value for of one permit token was 20 e.
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Fig. 3 Token price as a function of supply as specified in (4).
• AuthorityA allocated Enterprise E with allowances for 100 tCO2e by issuing
E 100 permit tokens.
• Verifier V approved Enterprise E ’s carbon-reducing project in a developing
country and granted E with credits for 40 tCO2e by issuing E 40 permit tokens.
• Enterprise E transferred 10 permit tokens to EnterpriseF .
2. On June 30, 2020, the market value of one permit token increased to 24 e.
• Enterprise E recorded 55 tCO2e emissions during January and June.
• Enterprise E cashed out 240 e by selling 10 tokens to the market.
3. On December 31, 2020, the market value of one permit token decreased to 22 e.
• Enterprise E recorded 70 tCO2e emissions during June and December.
• Enterprise E bought 5 permit tokens from the market to cover the emissions.
• Enterprise E surrenders 125 permit tokens to offset the total emissions of
125 tCO2e during year 2020.
In Table 2, we juxtapose smart contract executionwith double-entry journalisation
to show the correspondence of the two systems. We use the fair value method to
record “Emission permit”, following [39, 36].
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Table 2 Carbon accounting with smart contract execution and journalisation
Smart contract execution Journalisation Dr. Cr.
mintPermit(A , E , 100) Asset Emission permit– Allowances 2,000
Liability Deferred income 2,000
grantPermit(V , E , 40) Asset Emission permit – Credits 800
Liability Deferred income 800
transferPermit(E ,F , 10) Asset Deferred income 200
Liability Emission rights 200
Asset Emission permit 480
Equity Gain on revaluation 480
mintEmission(V , E , 55) Liability Deferred income 1,100
Equity Income 1,100
Equity Expenses – Emissions 1,320
Liability Permit surrenderable 1,320
convertCash(E , -240) Asset Cash 240
Asset Emission permit 240
Equity Deferred income 200
Equity Income 200
Equity Loss on revaluation 240
Asset Emission permit 240
mintEmission(V , E , 70) Liability Deferred income 1,300
Equity Income 1,300
Equity Expenses – Emissions 1,430
Liability Permit surrenderable 1,430
tradeToken(E , 5) Asset Emission permit 110
Asset Cash 110
burnToken(E , 125) Liability Permit surrenderable 2,750
Asset Emission permit 2,750
4 Further challenges and considerations
Implementation The specific platform chosen to host a blockchain ETS is a par-
ticularly important consideration. In [10], Bitcoin, Ethereum, Hyperledger Fabric
and EOS are evaluated for climate policy applications, considering programmab-
ility, operating cost, security and usability, with the conclusion that Ethereum and
Hyperledger Fabric are found to be the most promising platforms today. Similarly,
[33] considers Ethereum and Hyperledger Fabric as strong candidate frameworks for
ETS implementation, noting important distinctions between the two: Ethereum is by
default public and permissionless; Hyperledger Fabric is private and permissioned.
A more complete discussion of many other platforms can be found in [2].
As discussed previously, both developing a derivative blockchain solution (such
as using Hyperledger Fabric) and developing an entirely custom implementation
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should be considered in finding an approach to host ETS at large scale. The relative
benefit of building upon an established system (e.g. pre-existing audited and/or open-
source code) must be weighed against the degree of customisation desired. Further,
should differing implementations be developed by governments or organisations,
standardisation could still enable interoperability [14].
Governance and trust Since the “the allocation of allowances, the opening and
closing of ETS registry accounts or the recognition of offset credits are ... [still] sov-
ereign tasks of the government”, a comprehensive carbon network would by default
involve governments as central authorities [9]. The initial delegation of authority in a
permissioned blockchain ETS requires participants to trust the authority establishing
the network and thus the integrity of the tokens issued. With ETS linkage that con-
nects different states and regions, it cannot be guaranteed that every participant will
trust all authorities equally, imposing the need for an on-chain governance design
that ensures the integrity of authorities. Importantly, whilst smart contracts may be
ideally suited to the rigorous application of defined rules, these rules must first be
developed in collaboration with stakeholders [16].
Further, a potential future shift towards a decentralised blockchainwithout explicit
governmental oversight presents a significant complication: should there be trust
asymmetries between players, the fungibility of tokens issued by different entities
will be challenged and could lead to fragmentation of the network. One solution
could be standardisation [14].
Enforcement Current ETS utilise legislation to compel enterprises to participate.
Whilst a voluntary carbon market does also exist, it is significantly smaller than
the regulatory compliance market [42]. In a completely decentralised international
ETS, it is less clear what would motivate participants. Additionally, defining how
criminal activity on the network would be deterred is challenging, potentially requir-
ing a supranational enforcement body to maintain network integrity; indeed, “new
governance systems will be needed to ensure market and environmental integrity in
a peer-to-peer environment” [16].
Measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) A critical issue with any block-
chain solution is its interface with the real world [44]; the maxim “garbage in,
garbage out” aptly illustrates the consequences of poor input data. The verification
and accreditation processes in the EU ETS are complex and potentially burdensome
[19]. Moving beyond the model of trusted verifiers to a truly decentralised approach
will require significant effort to develop alternative MRV methodologies.
The internet of things (IoT) will enable a universally trusted mechanism for MRV
of real-world data, by automating data flows and processes [16, 21]. IoT technology
is expected to reduce the cost and time requirement of MRV, whilst enhancing
trust through increased reliability and the accessibility of audited code. Real-time
sensing will enable a faster compliance cycle than the current yearly process in the
EU ETS [9, 21]. Increased trading activity through more frequent reporting and
compliance will enhance market liquidity. Additionally, diverse data sources such as
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earth observation satellites will enable stronger verification of reported emissions or
emissions reductions.
Performance It is well known that blockchain networks can have extremely poor
performance relative to simple databases, especially in electricity usage [16, 3]. One
study has estimated that the global Bitcoin network consumes approximately asmuch
power as the country of Ireland, and forecasts this consumption more than tripling
in future [45]. Various alternative consensus mechanisms have been proposed to
improve performance and reduce the environmental impact of the infrastructure
itself [5, 38].
5 Conclusion
Having investigated the potential applicability of blockchain technology to carbon
trading on ETS, we can conclude that although there is potential for blockchain
to enhance the impact and reach of current ETS in a number of ways, significant
barriers remain, limiting the applicability of the technology today. A basic outline
of a permissioned blockchain solution largely replicating today’s EU ETS has been
presented as a viable transitional first step towards the development of a fully-
decentralised blockchain ETS, which could significantly accelerate the deployment
of this important emissions reduction tool worldwide. We conclude however that
significant legislative and legal barriers remain to be overcome for a decentralised
blockchain ETS to realise its full potential on implementation.
Appendix
A Bancor algorithm for token exchange
As demonstrated with Algorithms 7 and 8, the Bancor exchange protocol [40, 25]
ensures constant tradability of a token, as it prices a token algorithmically, as opposed
to through matching a buyer and a seller. We use the notation outlined in Table 3 to
explain the protocol.
For demonstration purposes, we assume that the medium of exchange is a stable-
coin, measured in e, that circulates on the same blockchain as the permit tokens.
It holds that, the stablecoin reserve C (in e), always equals a fraction, prede-
termined as F, of the product of token price P (in e/token) and outstanding token
supply s (in tokens). That is, the following equation is always true:
C(s) ≡ F s P(s) (1)
Taking the derivative with respect to s on both sides:
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Table 3 Mathematical notation for token exchange
Notation Definition Unit
Preset hyperparameters, occasionally adjusted
F Constant fraction of stablecoin reserve —
Input variables
s0 Pre-transaction outstanding token supply tokens
C0 Pre-transaction stablecoin reserve e/token
e Tokens bought (negative when sold) tokens
t Stablecoins spent (negative when received) e
Output variables
s Post-transaction token supply tokens
P(.) Post-transaction token price, dependent on token supply s e/token
C(.) Post-transaction stablecoin reserve, dependent on token supply s e
dC(s)
ds
≡ F
[
P(s) + sdP(s)
ds
]
(2)
There exists another relationship between C, P and s: if one buys from the
exchange an infinitesimal amount of tokens, ds, when the outstanding token supply
is s, then the unit token price at purchase would be P(s). The exchange receives
stablecoins and thus its reserve increases according to:
dC(s) = P(s) ds
Rearranging:
P(s) = dC(s)
ds
(3)
Combining (2) and (3), we can derive price P(.) as a function of s as follows,
which ultimately leads to (4):
P(s) = F
[
P(s) + sdP(s)
ds
]
dP(s)
P(s) =
(
1
F
− 1
)
ds
s
Integrating over s ∈ (s0, s):
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x=P(s0)
dx
x
=
(
1
F
− 1
) ∫ s
y=s0
dy
y
ln P(s) − ln C0
F s0
=
(
1
F
− 1
)
(ln s − ln s0)
P(s) = C0
F s
F
√
s
s0
(4)
Plugging (4) into (1), we can derive the exchange’s stablecoin reserve C(.) as a
function of s:
C(s) = F s C0
F s
F
√
s
s0
= C0 F
√
s
s0
(5)
Assume one spends t amount of stablecoins in exchange for e amount of tokens
when the outstanding token supply equal s0. After the purchase, the outstanding
token supply becomes s0 + e, while the stablecoin reserve increases by t, i.e.,
t + C0 = C(s0 + e) according to (5)= C0 F
√
s0 + e
s0
= C0 F
√
1 +
e
s0
(6)
Rearranging (6), we get:
• the amount of stablecoins one must pay, denoted by t, based on the amount of
tokens one wishes to receive, denoted by e, and the outstanding token supply s
(Algorithm 7),
t = C0
(
F
√
1 +
e
s0
− 1
)
(7)
• the amount of tokens one will receive, denoted by e, based on the amount of
stablecoins one is willing to pay, denoted by t, and the outstanding token supply
s (Algorithm 8).
e = s0
[(
t
C0
+ 1
)F
− 1
]
(8)
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